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Abstract
When there is strategic complementarity of consumption between
neighbors in a social network, we find that certain consumers may
have a bigger impact than other consumers on the market demand
and therefore the equilibrium price. The influence that a particular
consumer has on the market demand depends on the network struc-
ture and the consumer’s location in the network. This analysis may,
for example, shed light on the segment of consumers that should be
the target of selective advertisements or promotions.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D11, D41, D51, Z13
Keywords: Walrasian Equilibrium, Strategic Complementarity, Net-
works
1 Introduction
The recent decades have been marked by an increasingly interconnected
world due largely to advances in communication and transportation tech-
nology. The ubiquitous cellular phone, the television, and the Internet have
become almost indispensable to present day living. They have, to an un-
precedented extent, enabled interaction among people who are physically
separated. Cars and air travel have become much more accessible forms of
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transportation, while mass transit systems have become common features of
urban living throughout the world. Political and economic developments in
the European Union, Eastern Europe, and China have resulted in an explo-
sion of emigration and travel. As a result of all these technological and social
developments, people are becoming increasingly interconnected both within
and between countries.
The consumption of fashion products, ostentatious products, gifts, game tick-
ets, guns and other forms of expenditures tend to be influenced by social or
cultural norms in a way that displays a high degree of conformism. For
example, our decisions to purchase a vacation package may be influence by
whether our friends are also going on the same trip, perhaps because the
trip would be more enjoyable with some friends. A household might keep up
with the purchases of only those other households it comes into social contact
with and not the purchases of the rest of the other households. However, be-
cause of the overlap of social circles, households that are distantly connected
through the network of neighbors can have an indirect, though somewhat
diminished, effect on one another’s purchases. It is useful to think of this
interaction among consumers occurring within a social network since con-
sumers would typically respond to only those other consumers in their social
circle rather than to respond to all other consumers. A network structure
allows much richer social interactions, rather than distinctly local or global
interactions.
This paper investigates how equilibrium prices are affected by consumers
interacting strategically with their neighbors in a social network. In order
to abstract from issues of market power and to focus on consumer behavior,
we consider an exchange economy comprising many agents endowed with two
goods. One of the two goods involves strategic complementarity in consump-
tion between neighbors in the social network. However because no agent has
market power over any good, the markets for both goods are competitive.
We use the vocabulary of graph theory and network games to describe the
strategic interactions occurring within the social network. The intention is
neither to explain why strategic complementarity in consumption occurs nor
to explain the existence of a social network. Instead, we would like to focus
on the consequences of such phenomena, that is, to determine how the net-
work structure affects the market demand and the equilibrium price.
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To examine the impact of a particular agent’s increased demand for a good,
we analyze the response of price to a change in the endowment of the agent
under various network structures. We find that the increase in supply of a
good may in fact raise its relative price. This effect depends on the structure
of the network and the source of the supply increase. This result suggests
that goods that involve strategic complementarity in consumption between
neighbors may become more valuable even as they become more abundant.
The idea that a consumer’s demand depends on the demands of other con-
sumers has been explored variedly in the literature. For example, a con-
sumer’s demand for a good may depend on the aggregate demand or net-
work externalities, that is, the number of consumers consuming [Duesenberry
(1949), Leibenstein (1950), Becker (1991), Karni and Levin (1994), Corneo
and Jeanne (1997), Grilo et al. (2001), Amaldoss and Jain (2005)]. Al-
ternatively, a consumer’s demand may be affected by the demands of other
consumers because his utility depends on how his consumption of the good
ranks against that of all other consumers [Frank (1985), Hopkins and Ko-
rnienko (2004), Hopkins and Kornienko (2006)]. There are also models that
incorporate both local and global interactions but treat the effects distinctly
[Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002), Horst and Scheinkman (2005)]. However,
these forms of social interactions do not take into consideration how con-
sumers not directly connected can be influenced indirectly and mutually by
other consumers via a network of social relations. There is a growing litera-
ture on network formation and network games, which show how the structure
of networks affects equilibrium outcomes [Galeotti et al. (2006)]. Discrete
choice interactions have been analyzed in a network structure but not with
reference to the price mechanism [Ioannides (2006)].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general
model, which includes a discussion of a few prominent network structures.
Section 3 examines the equilibrium in the minimum consumption model un-
der the various network structures. Section 4 concludes. The appendix con-
tains the proofs.
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2 The General Model
Given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, an undirected network g is a set of
pairs of agents linked to each other. For any pair of agents i and j, ij ∈ g
indicates that i and j are linked in the network g.
A pair of agents are neighbors in a network g if and only if they are linked in
the network g. The set of agents with at least one neighbor in the network g
is N(g) = {j ∈ N : ∃ ij ∈ g}. The set of neighbors of agent i in the network
g is Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g}. The degree of agent i is ni(g) = |Ni(g)|, the
number of neighbors that agent i has in network g. Assume that every agent
has at least one neighbor in the network g so thatN(g) = N andNi(g) 6= {φ}.
A path in the network g connecting agents i and j is a sequence of dis-
tinct neighbors i1, . . . , iK such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}
with i1 = i and iK = j. The length of a path connecting agents i and j is
the number of links connecting agents i and j on that path.
A network is connected if there exists a path connecting any agent to any
other agent in the network. A network g′ ⊂ g is a component of network g
if it is a maximal connected subnetwork of network g. That is,
(a) if i ∈ N(g′), j ∈ N(g′), and j 6= i, then there exists a path in g′ con-
necting i and j, and
(b) if i ∈ N(g′), j ∈ N(g), j 6= i, and ij ∈ g, then ij ∈ g′.
The set of components of network g is C(g), so that g =
⋃
g′∈C(g) g
′. Since
neighbors are in the same component of a network, the set of neighbors of
agent i in the component g′ of the network g is equivalent to the set of neigh-
bors of agent i in the network g. That is, Ni(g
′) = Ni(g).
The distance between any pair of agents i and j in the same component
g′ is dij(g′), the length of the shortest path between the pair of agents. For
any integer k ≥ 1, the set of all other agents that are connected to agent
i by a distance of k is Nki (g
′) = {j ∈ N(g′) : j 6= i, dij(g′) = k}. Hence,
N1i (g
′) = Ni(g′). The cardinality of Nki (g) is n
k
i (g) = |Nki (g)|. The ec-
centricity of agent i is i(g
′) = maxj∈N(g′) dij(g′), the maximum distance
between agent i and any other agent in the same component g′.
The radius of a component is d(g′) = minij∈g′ dij(g′), the minimum ec-
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centricity of any agent in the component. The diameter of a component
is d¯(g′) = maxij∈g′ dij(g′), the maximum eccentricity of any agent in the
component. The closeness of an agent i in the component is ci(g
′) =
1P
j∈N(g′)\{i} dij(g′)
, the reciprocal of the sum of distances to all other agents in
the component. An agent is central in a component if its eccentricity is
equal to the radius of the component. The center of a component is the set
of all central agents. An agent is peripheral in a component if its eccen-
tricity is equal to the diameter of the component.
There are two goods - 1 and 2. xi` denotes agent i’s consumption of good `.
ωi` denotes agent i’s endowment of good `. Both goods are traded throughout
the economy so no agent has market power over any good. The price of good
1, which is the numeraire, is normalized to one and so the price of good 2,
p, is also the price of good 2 relative to good 1. The wealth level of agent i,
mi = ωi1+ pω
i
2, is endogenously determined by the equilibrium price and the
pattern of endowments.
Agents have identical, continuous, strictly convex, and strongly monotone
preferences over goods 1 and 2. Hence, each agent i’s preferences can be
represented by a strictly quasiconcave and twice continuously differentiable
utility function ui(xi1, x
i
2, x
Ni(g)
2 ), where x
Ni(g)
2 is the vector of good 2 con-
sumptions by each of the agents in the set of agents Ni(g). There is no
restriction on whether the good 2 consumption of each neighbor is a positive
or negative externality, that is, there is no restriction on the sign of ui
xj2
per
se, where j ∈ Ni(g). For any given level of good 2 consumption by each of its
neighbors, each agent chooses its consumption of goods 1 and 2 to maximize
its utility subject to its budget constraint. Formally,
∀ i ∈ N : max
{xi1,xi2}
ui(xi1, x
i
2, x
Ni(g)
2 ) s.t. x
i
1 + px
i
2 = m
i = ωi1 + pω
i
2
There is strategic complementarity in the consumption of good 2 between
each pair of neighbors in that an agent would increase its consumption of
good 2 if its neighbor does so, holding all other factors, including the price,
constant. Formally,
∀ i ∈ N, j ∈ Ni(g) : (∂x
i
2
∂xj2
)x2,p,mi > 0
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Since we seek to determine the effect of a particular agent’s increased demand
from a change in the agent’s endowment, we assume that both goods are
normal. Formally,
∀ i ∈ N : ( ∂x
i
`
∂mi
)x2,p > 0
The above two conditions depend on ordinal properties of the utility func-
tion because the best response function, which is implicitly determined by
the first order conditions, is invariant to a monotonic transformation of the
utility function. The best response correspondences are in fact best response
functions because the utility functions are strictly quasiconcave.
Definition 1 (Nash-Walrasian Equilibrium). (xN1 , x
N
2 , p) is aNash-Walrasian
Equilibrium if it satisfies every agent’s best response function and budget
constraint, and the market for good 2 clears. That is,
∀ i ∈ N : ui
xi2
= pui
xi1
which implicitly determines xi2 = x
i
2(x
Ni(g)
2 , p,m
i)
∀ i ∈ N : xi1 + pxi2 = mi = ωi1 + pωi2∑
i∈N
xi2 =
∑
i∈N
ωi2
Lemma 1 (Demand Correspondences). Given every agent’s best response
function and budget constraint, each agent’s demand for each good is a cor-
respondence of the relative price of the two goods and the wealth levels of
every agent in its component of the network. That is,
∀ g′ ∈ C(g), i ∈ N(g′) : xi1 ∈ xi1(p,mN(g′)) and xi2 ∈ xi2(p,mN(g′))
As long as there is a path connecting a pair of agents, their demands and
therefore their incomes would affect each other’s demand. Whether the de-
mand correspondences are in fact demand functions depends on the ordinal
curvature properties of the best response functions and their upper and lower
bounds [Randon (2004)].
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Without loss of generality, we can examine the effect of an increase in the
endowment of good 2 held by an agent by a perturbation of ω12, the endow-
ment of good 2 held by agent 1.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Price). Given a downward-sloping aggregate
demand for good 2, its price is increasing in the endowment of an agent’s
endowment of the good if any resulting increase in aggregate demand exceeds
the increase in endowment.
This proposition is a generalization of that which would emerge if prefer-
ences were independent. It holds for all network structures.
Definition 2 (Influence). Agent i’s influence on aggregate demand is equal
to ∂p
∂ωi2
, the marginal effect of an increase in agent i’s endowment of good 2
on the price of good 2.
Influence is a measure of the centrality of an agent in the network. We
would like to determine which agents in the economy have a higher influence
on aggregate demand and how the network structure affects their influence.
Network Structures: Network structures can be categorized into those
which are regular and those which are irregular. Since there are very many
possible regular and irregular networks, we focus our attention on a few
prominent network structures. The aim is to show how aggregate demand
and prices are affected by whether the network is regular or not, and by the
particular network structure in question. Within the class of regular net-
works, we consider the complete network and the ring network. Within the
class of irregular networks, we consider the star network and the line network.
A network is regular if all agents have the same number of neighbors. That
is,
∀ i ∈ N : ni(g) = r where r is a non-negative integer
A network is complete if all agents are linked to one another. Hence, for any
agent, every other agent is a neighbor of the agent. This network structure
in effect describes the case of global interactions. Formally,
g = {ij : i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j 6= i}
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⇒

∀ i ∈ N : i(g) = 1
∀ i ∈ N : Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : j 6= i}
∀ i ∈ N : ni(g) = n− 1
A network is a ring if there is a single cycle through all agents. Hence every
agent has a pair of neighbors. Without loss of generality, assume that agent
1 is linked to agent 2, which is, in turn, linked to agent 3, and so on until
agent n. In addition, agent n is linked to agent 1, thereby completing the
single cycle. Formally,
g = {ij : i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j = i± 1}
⋃
{1n}
∀ i ∈ N : i(g) =
{
n
2
if n is even
n−1
2
if n is odd
∀ k ≤ n−1
2
:
Nki (g) =

{j ∈ N : j = i± k}⋃{i+ (n− k)} if i = 1, . . . , k
{j ∈ N : j = i± k} if i = k + 1, . . . , n− k
{j ∈ N : j = i± k}⋃{i− (n− k)} if i = n− k + 1, . . . , n
∀ k = n
2
:
Nki (g) =
{ {j ∈ N : j = i± k}⋃{i+ (n− k)} if i = 1, . . . , k
{j ∈ N : j = i± k}⋃{i− (n− k)} if i = n− k + 1, . . . , n
∀ i ∈ N : ni(g) = 2
Turning to the class of irregular networks, we first consider the star network,
which is a maximally centralized network. A network is a star if it has
one central agent and all other agents are linked only to the central agent.
Without loss of generality, assume that the central agent is agent 1. Formally,
g = {ij : i = 1, j ∈ N\{1}}
∀ i ∈ N : i(g) =
{
1 if i = 1
2 if i ∈ N\{1}
Ni(g) =
{
N\{1} if i = 1
{1} if i ∈ N\{1}
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N2i (g) =
{ {φ} if i = 1
N\{1, i} if i ∈ N\{1}
ni(g) =
{
n− 1 if i = 1
1 if i ∈ N\{1}
A network is a line if all agents form a single acyclic path. Without loss
of generality, assume that the path connects agent 1 to agent n through all
other agents. It would identical to the ring but for the absence of a link
between agent 1 and agent n. Formally,
g = {ij : i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j = i± 1}
∀ i ∈ N : i(g) = max{n− i, i− 1}
∀ i ∈ N, ∀ k ≥ 1 : Nki (g) = {j ∈ N : j = i± k}
ni(g) =
{
1 if i ∈ {1, n}
2 if i ∈ N\{1, n}
3 The Minimum Consumption Model
In order to impose more structure on each agent’s best response function,
we consider a specific model that introduces two sets of assumptions. First,
assume that agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences symmetric in
both goods. This assumption is consistent with the requirement that both
goods are normal. Second, assume that every agent needs to consume an
amount of good 2 that exceeds the fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of the average good 2
consumption of its neighbors. This is similar to the Stone-Geary utility [Stone
(1954), Geary (1950-1951)], where consumption needs to exceed a certain
parameterized minimum level, except that the minimum level of consumption
here is not parameterized but is endogenously determined. Formally,
∀ i ∈ N : max
{xi1,xi2}
xi1(x
i
2−α
1
ni(g)
∑
j∈Ni(g)
xj2) s.t. x
i
1+px
i
2 = m
i = ωi1+pω
i
2
As a result, the best response function of each agent is linear in the good 2
consumption of each of its neighbors:
∀ i ∈ N : xi2 =
1
2p
(mi + αp
1
ni(g)
∑
j∈Ni(g)
xj2)
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⇒ ∀ i ∈ N, j ∈ Ni(g) : ( ∂x
i
2
∂mi
)x2,p =
1
2p
, (
∂xi2
∂xj2
)x2,p,mi =
α
2ni(g)
This further implies that, holding the price and the demands of other agents
constant, an agent would increase its consumption of good 2 by half the in-
crease of its endowment of the good. Since the agent’s increase in demand
is independent of its own wealth and the consumption levels of the agent’s
neighbors, this ensures that, before taking into consideration the reaction of
other agents, every agent responds symmetrically to an increase in its own
endowment. Another implication is that, holding all other factors constant,
the response of an agent to the good 2 consumption of one of its neighbors
is decreasing in the number of neighbors that the agent has. This also sim-
plifies the situation because the response is hence independent of the price,
the agent’s wealth, and the consumption levels of the agent’s neighbors.
Regular Networks:
Proposition 2 (Regular Networks). In the minimum consumption model
with a regular network, the price of good 2 is decreasing in the endowment
of good 2 held by any agent and independent of the number of neighbors that
every agent has.
In a regular network, since every agent has the same number of neighbors,
an agent i’s response to the an increased demand by any neighbor j ∈ Ni(g),
(
∂xi2
∂xj2
)x2,p,mi , is the same for every agent. Hence, the response of aggregate
demand to an increase in the endowment of good 2 is independent of the
number of agents in the economy because the multiplier 1
1−Pj∈Ni(g)(
∂xi2
∂x
j
2
)x2,p,mi
is independent of the number of neighbors that every agent has. The greater
the number of neighbors, the greater the number of neighbors responding to
the increase in demand for good 2 by agent i. However, at the same time,
every agent responds proportionately less to the increase in demand because
every agent has more neighbors. The two opposing effects on the multiplier
exactly counteract each other.
Corollary 1 (Regular Networks). In the minimum consumption model with
a regular network, every agent has the same level of influence on aggregate
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demand.
This follows from Proposition 2.
Since no agent has a higher influence than any other agent in a regular
network, this suggests that no segment of consumers would be favored over
any other in being the target of advertisements or promotions.
Complete Networks: Since complete networks are regular networks, ac-
cording to Proposition 2, the price of good 2 is decreasing in the endowment
of good 2.
From the best response function of every agent, we have:
Ax = b
where A = (aij) ∈ Rn×n with aij =
{
2 if i = j
− α
n−1 if i 6= j
x =
 x
1
2
...
xn2
 , b =

m1
p
...
mn
p

Solving for x, we obtain the demand function for each agent:
∀ i ∈ N : xi2 = 1p [ 2(n−1)−(n−2)α4(n−1)−2(n−2)α−α2mi + α4(n−1)−2(n−2)α−α2
∑
j∈Ni(g)
mj]
In the absence of the strategic complementarity in consumption of good 2
between each pair of neighbors, that is, if α = 0, then each agent’s demand
for each good depends only on its own income. However, with the strategic
complementarity between neighbors, each agent’s consumption of each good
depends not just on its own income but also on the income of all other agents.
From the demand functions, we have:∑
i∈N
(
∂xi2
∂ω12
)p =
1
2− α < 1
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Hence, the increase in aggregate demand for good 2 is less than the increase
in endowment of the good, and the extent of which is independent of the
number of agents.
Ring Networks: Since ring networks are regular networks, according to
Proposition 2, the price of good 2 is decreasing in the endowment of good 2.
From the best response function of every agent, we have:
Ax = b
where A =

2 −α
2
0 . . . 0 −α
2−α
2
2 −α
2
0 . . . 0
0 −α
2
2 −α
2
. . .
...
... 0 −α
2
2
. . . 0
0
...
. . . . . . . . . −α
2−α
2
0 . . . 0 −α
2
2

∈ Rn×n, a circulant matrix,
x =
 x
1
2
...
xn2
 , b =

m1
p
...
mn
p

Solving for x, we obtain the demand function for each agent:
∀ i ∈ N : xi2 = 1p [C1,1|A| mi +
i(g)∑
k=1
Ck+1,1
|A|
∑
j∈Nki (g)
mj]
where the cofactor Ci,j of matrix A is (−1)i+j times the determinant of the
matrix formed by removing row i and column j of matrix A.
An agent’s sensitivity of demand to another agent’s income depends on the
distance between the pair of agents. The greater the distance between the
pair of agents, the less sensitive an agent’s demand is to the other agent.
Star Networks: Turning to irregular networks, we begin with star net-
works. From the best response function of every agent, we have:
Ax = b
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where A =

2 − α
n−1 . . . . . . − αn−1
−α 2 0 . . . 0
... 0 2
. . .
...
...
...
. . . . . . 0
−α 0 . . . 0 2
 ∈ Rn×n,
x =
 x
1
2
...
xn2
 , b =

m1
p
...
mn
p

Solving for x, we obtain the demand function for each agent:
xi2 =

1
p
( 2
4−α2m
i + α
4−α2
1
n−1
∑
j∈N\{1}
mj) if i = 1
1
p
(4(n−1)−(n−2)α
2
4−α2
1
2(n−1)m
i + α
4−α2m
1 + α
2
4−α2
1
2(n−1)
∑
k∈N2i (g)
mk) if i ∈ N\{1}
A peripheral agent’s demand for good 2 is more sensitive to the central agent’s
income than the income of other peripheral agents because the central agent
is a neighbor whereas the other peripheral agents are connected by a distance
of two.
Proposition 3 (Star Network). In the minimum consumption model with a
star network, the price of good 2 is increasing in the endowment of good 2
held by the central agent if the fraction α is large enough.
The central agent has all other agents as neighbors and so has all other
agents responding to its increase in demand for good 2. In addition, these
other agents respond sensitively to the central agent’s increased demand for
good 2 because the central agent is their only neighbor. As the number of
peripheral agents approaches infinity, the number of neighbors the central
agent has approaches infinity and so the critical value of α decreases and
approaches zero.
In contrast, the price of good 2 is decreasing in the endowment of good
2 held by a peripheral agent. This is because a peripheral agent has only one
agent, the central agent, responding to its increase in demand. In addition,
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the central agent does not respond sensitively to the peripheral agent’s de-
mand increase because it has many other neighbors as well. As the number
of peripheral agents increases, the number of neighbors for each peripheral
agent remains constant but the number of agents connected to each periph-
eral agent by a distance of two increases.
Corollary 2 (Star Network). In the minimum consumption model with a
star network, the central agent has a higher influence than all other agents.
This follows from Proposition 3.
Since the central agent also has the highest closeness, the analysis of the
minimum consumption model with a star network seems to suggest that an
agent’s closeness is the key to its relative influence over market demand in
the network. However, we shall see, in the analysis of line networks, that
closeness does not in fact determine an agent’s influence.
Line Networks: From the best response function of every agent, we have:
Ax = b
where A =

2 −α 0 . . . . . . 0
−α
2
2 −α
2
. . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
...
. . . −α
2
2 −α
2
0 . . . . . . 0 −α 2

∈ Rn×n, a tridiagonal matrix,
x =
 x
1
2
...
xn2
 , b =

m1
p
...
mn
p

Proposition 4 (Line Network). In the minimum consumption model with a
line network, the price of good 2 is increasing in the endowment of good 2
held by a non-peripheral agent if the fraction α is large enough.
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The critical value of α is increasing in the number of agents because every
non-peripheral agent’s influence is correspondingly reduced. This is because
an additional agent linked to a peripheral agent decreases the hitherto pe-
ripheral agent’s response to its hitherto only neighbor. This reduced response
is translated across the line network to other agents.
Corollary 3 (Line Network). In the minimum consumption model with a
line network, the agents with the kth highest influence are the non-peripheral
agents connected to the nearest peripheral agent by a distance of k.
The critical value of α is increasing in an agent’s distance to the nearest
peripheral agent but is asymptotic to a value less than one.
Proposition 5 (Influence). In the minimum consumption model, the influ-
ence of an agent on aggregate demand is increasing in the agent’s degree but
decreasing in the degree of any other agent connected to it.
For each non-peripheral agent, the critical value of α is increasing in the
number of agents linked to a peripheral agent. Equivalently, the influence
of each non-peripheral agent is decreasing in the number of agents linked to
a peripheral agent. An agent with a higher degree has more other agents
responding to the agent’s increase in demand. This response is greater if the
agents responding have a lower degree. For example, in the six-agent line
network, the central agents (3 and 4) have the same degree and in fact a
higher measure of closeness than agents 2 and 5. However, agents 2 and 5
each have a neighbor that has only one link and so the neighbor provides a
greater response to each of agents 2 and 5. This is because, in the minimum
consumption example, an agent responds to the average of its neighbors.
Hence, the importance of an agent on market demand does not depend on
its centrality per se.
This analysis suggests that sellers of a product should want to focus their ad-
vertising and promotional efforts on those consumers who have a relatively
high influence on the consumption of others, specifically those with many
neighbors who in turn have few neighbors themselves. A highly centralized
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network, such as a star, offers sellers the opportunity to focus their promo-
tional attempts at the central agent, which has a large impact on market
demand.
4 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper shows that where consumers tend to conform with
the average purchases of their neighbors in a social network, unless the net-
work structure is fairly regular, certain consumers, by virtue of their location
in the network, would tend to have a greater influence on aggregate demand
than other consumers. Contrary to what one might expect, it is not an
agent’s closeness or degree per se that matters for its relative influence on
market demand. Instead, the number of neighbors of an agent’s neighbors
also matters for the agent’s influence. Since promotional efforts are costly,
producers would be better off focusing their efforts on those consumers who
have a relatively large influence on the purchase of others.
We have considered only connected networks in the analysis. Within the
model in this paper, we can also analyze how prices are affected when net-
works are disconnected, comprising a number of components.
We have considered on a general equilibrium model to focus on the effect
of consumer behavior on prices. We can also incorporate firm behavior by
considering a partial equilibrium model. A variety of industry structures can
be considered in this context, including strategic interaction among firms.
It may also be possible to consider directed networks. Directed networks
may be especially relevant when considering the impact of celebrities and
other prominent figures whose consumption patterns are observed by many
in the general public, but who do not in turn observe the consumption pat-
terns of those who observe their consumption patterns.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (Demand Correspondences):
∀ g′ ∈ C(g), i ∈ N(g′) : Ni(g) = Ni(g′) and xi2 = xi2(xNi(g)2 , p,mi)
⇒ xi2 = xi2(xNi(g
′)
2 , p,m
i)
⇒ xi2 ∈ xi2(xN
2
i (g
′)
2 , p,m
{i}SNi(g′))
⇒ xi2 ∈ xi2(xN
3
i (g
′)
2 , p,m
{i}SNi(g′)
S
N2i (g
′))
...
⇒ xi2 ∈ xi2(xN
i
i (g
′)
2 , p,m
{i}SNi(g′)
S
N2i (g
′)
S
...
S
N
i−1
i (g
′))
⇒ xi2 ∈ xi2(p,m{i}
S
Ni(g
′)
S
N2i (g
′)
S
...
S
N
i
i (g
′))
⇒ xi2 ∈ xi2(p,m
{i}S(
i(g
′)S
k=1
Nki (g
′))
)
⇒ xi2 ∈ xi2(p,mN(g
′))
⇒ xi1 ∈ xi1(p,mN(g
′))

Proof of Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Price):
⇒

ui
xi2x
i
1
dxi1 + u
i
xi2x
i
2
dxi2 +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
ui
xi2x
j
2
dxj2 = p(u
i
xi1x
i
1
dxi1 + u
i
xi1x
i
2
dxi2 +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
ui
xi1x
j
2
dxj2) + u
i
xi1
dp
dx11 + pdx
1
2 + x
1
2dp = dm
1 = pdω12 + ω
1
2dp
∀ i\1 : dxi1 + pdxi2 + xi2dp = dmi = ωi2dp∑
i∈N
dxi2 = dω
1
2
⇒

(ui
xi2x
i
1
− pui
xi1x
i
1
)dxi1 + (u
i
xi2x
i
2
− pui
xi1x
i
2
)dxi2 +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
(ui
xi2x
j
2
− pui
xi1x
j
2
)dxj2 − uixi1dp = 0
dx11 = pdω
1
2 + (ω
1
2 − x12)dp− pdx12
∀ i\1 : dxi1 = (ωi2 − xi2)dp− pdxi2∑
i∈N
dxi2 = dω
1
2
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⇒
[u1
x12x
1
2
− pu1
x11x
1
2
− p(u1
x12x
1
1
− pu1
x11x
1
1
)]dx12 +
∑
j∈N1(g)
(u1
x12x
j
2
− pu1
x11x
j
2
)dxj2
+[(ω12 − x12)(u1x12x11 − pu
1
x11x
1
1
)− u1
x11
]dp = −p(u1
x12x
1
1
− pu1
x11x
1
1
)dω12
∀ i\1 : [ui
xi2x
i
2
− pui
xi1x
i
2
− p(ui
x12x
i
1
− pui
xi1x
i
1
)]dxi2 +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
(ui
xi2x
j
2
− pui
xi1x
j
2
)dxj2
+[(ωi2 − xi2)(uixi2xi1 − pu
i
xi1x
i
1
)− ui
xi1
]dp = 0
∑
i∈N
dxi2 = dω
1
2
⇒

dx12
dω12
+
∑
j∈N1(g)
u1
x12x
j
2
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x11x
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1
2
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2
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1
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1
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x11x
1
1
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x11
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1
2
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1
2
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1
1
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1
1
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dp
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x12x
1
1
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1
1
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1
2
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2
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1
1
−pu1
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1
1
)
∀ i\1 : dxi2
dω12
+
∑
j∈Ni(g)
ui
xi2x
j
2
−pui
xi1x
j
2
ui
xi2x
i
2
−pui
xi1x
i
2
−p(ui
xi2x
i
1
−pui
xi1x
i
1
)
dxj2
dω12
+
(ωi2−xi2)(uixi2xi1
−pui
xi1x
i
1
)−ui
xi1
ui
xi2x
i
2
−pui
xi1x
i
2
−p(ui
xi2x
i
1
−pui
xi1x
i
1
)
dp
dω12
= 0
∑
i∈N
dxi2
dω12
= 1
⇒

dx12
dω12
− ∑
j∈N1(g)
(
∂x12
∂xj2
)x2,p,m1
dxj2
dω12
− (∂x12
∂p
)x2
dp
dω12
= p(
∂x12
∂m1
)x2,p
∀ i\1 : dxi2
dω12
− ∑
j∈Ni(g)
(
∂xi2
∂xj2
)x2,p,mi
dxj2
dω12
− (∂xi2
∂p
)x2
dp
dω12
= 0
∑
i∈N
dxi2
dω12
= 1
where (
∂xi2
∂p
)x2 = (
∂xi2
∂p
)x2,ui+(
∂xi2
∂mi
)x2,p(ω
i
2−xi2) = (
∂xi2
∂p
)x2,mi+(
∂xi2
∂mi
)x2,pω
i
2
which decomposes the substitution and income effects
⇒ Ax = b
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where A =

1 −(∂x12
∂x22
)x2,p,m1 . . . −( ∂x
1
2
∂xn2
)x2,p,m1 −(∂x
1
2
∂p
)x2
−(∂x22
∂x12
)x2,p,m2 1
. . .
...
...
...
. . . . . . −(∂xn−12
∂xn2
)x2,p,mn−1
...
−(∂xn2
∂x12
)x2,p,mn . . . −( ∂x
n
2
∂xn−12
)x2,p,mn 1 −(∂x
n
2
∂p
)x2
1 . . . . . . 1 0

with ∀ j /∈ Ni(g) : (∂x
i
2
∂xj2
)x2,p,mi = 0
and x =

dx12
dω12
...
dxn2
dω12
dp
dω12
 , b =

p(
∂x12
∂m1
)x2,p
0
...
0
1

⇒ dp
dω12
=
|An+1|
|A|
where An+1 is the matrix formed by replacing the (n+1)
th column of matrix
A with the column vector b.
⇒ dp
dω12
=
|An+1|
Mn+1,n+1
|A|
Mn+1,n+1
where the minor Mn+1,n+1 of matrix A is the determinant of the matrix
formed by removing row n+ 1 and column n+ 1 of matrix A.
⇒ dp
dω12
= −
∑
i∈N
(
∂xi2
∂ω12
)p − 1∑
i∈N
dxi2
dp

Proof of Proposition 2 (Regular Networks):
∀ i ∈ N : xi2 =
1
2p
(mi + αp
1
r
∑
j∈Ni(g)
xj2)
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∑
i∈N
mi + αp
1
r
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni(g)
xj2 = 2p
∑
i∈N
ωi2
∑
i∈N
mi + αp
r
r
∑
i∈N
xi2 = 2p
∑
i∈N
ωi2∑
i∈N
ωi1 + p
∑
i∈N
ωi2 + αp
∑
i∈N
ωi2 = 2p
∑
i∈N
ωi2
p =
1
1− α
∑
i∈N ω
i
1∑
i∈N ω
i
2
∀ i ∈ N : dp
dωi2
< 0

Proof of Proposition 3 (Star Network):
Combining every agent’s demand function for good 2 and the market clearing
condition for good 2, we can solve for the price of good 2:
p =
(n− 1)[2 + (n− 1)α]ω11 + [2(n− 1) + α]
∑
j∈N1(g)
ωj1
(n− 1)[2− (n− 1)α− α2]ω12 + [2(n− 1)− α− (n− 1)α2]
∑
j∈N1(g)
ωj2
dp
dω12
> 0 if α >
−(n− 1) +√(n− 1)2 + 8
2

Proof of Proposition 4 (Line Network):
From the best response of every agent and the market clearing condition,
the equilibrium price is implicitly determined by:
−
∣∣∣∣ A bιT 0
∣∣∣∣ = |A|∑
i∈N
ωi2
where ι is an n-vector of ones
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Assume n=3
p =
(4 + α)(ω11 + ω
3
1) + (4 + 4α)ω
2
1
(4− α− 2α2)(ω12 + ω32) + (4− 4α− 2α2)ω22
For i = 2 :
∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if 4− 4α− 2α2 < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0.732
Assume n=4
Agent i’s demand function for good 2:
xi2 =

1
p
[ (32−6α
2)mi+α(16−2α2)mNi(g)+4α2mN2i (g)+α3mN3i (g)
64−20α2+α4 ] if i ∈ {1, n}
1
p
[ (32−4α
2)mi+α(8−α2)mi−1+8αmi+1+2α2mi+2
64−20α2+α4 ] if i = 2
1
p
[ (32−4α
2)mi+α(8−α2)mi+1+8αmi−1+2α2mi−2
64−20α2+α4 ] if i = 3
Although non-peripheral agents 2 and (n − 1), which are the agents next
to the peripheral agents, each have a pair of neighbors, the income of their
peripheral neighbor has a smaller marginal effect on their demand for good
2 than the income of their non-peripheral neighbor.
p =
(8 + 2α− α2)(ω11 + ω41) + (8 + 6α− 12α3)(ω21 + ω31)
(8− 2α− 4α2 + 1
4
α4)(ω12 + ω
4
2) + (8− 6α− 5α2 + 12α3 + 14α4)(ω22 + ω32)
∀ i ∈ {2, 3} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if 8−6α−5α2+1
2
α3+
1
4
α4 < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0.828
Assume n=5
Agent i’s demand function for good 2:
xi2 =

1
p
[
(16−4α2+ 1
8
α4)mi+α(8− 3
2
α2)mNi(g)+α2(2− 1
4
α2)mN
2
i (g)+ 1
2
α3mN
3
i (g)+ 1
8
α4mN
4
i (g)
32−18α2+α4 ] if i ∈ {1, n}
1
p
[
(16−3α2)mi+α(4− 3
4
α2)mi−1+α(4− 1
2
α2)mi+1+α2mi+2+ 1
4
α3mi+3
32−12α2+α4 ] if i = 2
1
p
[
(16−3α2)mi+α(4− 3
4
α2)mi+1+α(4− 1
2
α2)mi−1+α2mi−2+ 1
4
α3mi−3
32−12α2+α4 ] if i = 4
1
p
[
(4− 1
2
α2)2mi+α(4− 1
2
α2)
P
j∈Ni(g)m
j+α2(1− 1
8
α2)
P
k∈N2
i
(g)
mk
32−12α2+α4 ] if i = 3
p =
(16+4α−3α2− 1
2
α3+ 1
8
α4)(ω11+ω
5
1)+(16+12α−2α2− 32α3)(ω21+ω41)+(16+8α−α3− 14α4)ω31
(16−4α−9α2+ 1
2
α3+ 7
8
α4)(ω12+ω
5
2)+(16−12α−10α2+ 32α3+α4)(ω22+ω42)+(16−8α−12α2+α3+ 54α4)ω32
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∀ i ∈ {2, 4} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if 16−12α−10α2+3
2
α3+α4 < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0.851
For i = 3 :
∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if 16− 8α− 12α2+α3+ 5
4
α4 < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0.927
Assume n=6
∀ i ∈ {2, 5} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if 32−24α−22α2+5α3+3α4−1
8
α5− 1
16
α6 < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0.856
∀ i ∈ {3, 4} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if 32−16α−24α2+5
2
α3+
7
2
α4− 1
16
α6 < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0.952
Assume n=7
∀ i ∈ {2, 6} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.857
∀ i ∈ {3, 5} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.959
For i = 4 :
∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.979
Assume n=8
∀ i ∈ {2, 7} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.857
∀ i ∈ {3, 6} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.961
∀ i ∈ {4, 5} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.986
Assume n=9
∀ i ∈ {2, 8} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.858
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∀ i ∈ {3, 7} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.961
∀ i ∈ {4, 6} : ∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.988
For i = 5 :
∂p
∂ωi2
> 0 if α > 0.994
...

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